The UK government stated all along that they would not make a decision as to the US use of Fylingdales in the Missile Defense System.  Suddenly in early February this year (but clearly a decision had been made a long time before) Geoff Hoon issued a press statement.  It is important information so we have included the full text (Press release/Written Statement, Defence Select Committee Press release and the MOD Memorandum response)

MOD Responds to US request to upgrade RAF Fylingdales:
 
Press Notice no: 025/03
05 February 2003

The Secretary of State for Defence, Geoff Hoon, today responded to the United States' request to upgrade RAF Fylingdales.

In a written statement to the House of Commons, Mr Hoon said:

"On 17 December I informed the House of the receipt of a request from the United States Government to upgrade the early warning radar at Fylingdales for missile defence purposes.

"The Government has encouraged Parliamentary and public discussion of the issues involved. On 17 October, I informed the House of current work in the
US on missile defence and, on 9 December, published a discussion paper, inviting interested parties to contribute their views. We have received a
large number of responses both from individuals and organisations, and we have considered all contributions carefully. I have visited North Yorkshire to explain what the upgrade would involve and to hear at first hand the views of local people. We have engaged in initial discussions with the
planning authorities. In an oral Statement on 15 January, I informed the House of the Government's preliminary conclusion that it was in the UK's
interest to agree to the US request. I gave evidence to the Defence Select Committee on the same day and addressed points raised by hon Members in the
Defence Debate on 22 January. I welcome the Select Committee's conclusion, in their report published on 29 January, that the UK should agree to the
upgrade.

"In the course of these discussions we have been able to clarify that: the upgrade essentially comprises computer hardware and software modification,
and involves no new development or change to the external appearance or power output of the radar; the radar will continue to fulfil its long-established Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) role; it will continue to be operated and staffed by the Royal Air Force, and we will continue to enjoy full access to its data; and the upgrade does not of
itself commit the UK Government to any greater participation in the US missile defence programme. It does, however, keep open the prospect of
acquiring missile defence capabilities for the UK, should we desire such protection at some point in the future. We will continue discussions with the local planning authorities on the detail of the upgrade work.

"I am now satisfied that we have been able to take fully into account the views of all interested parties in coming to a decision. I am therefore today replying to the United States Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, conveying the Government's agreement to the US request. We are separately
negotiating a technical Memorandum of Understanding to give British industry the best possible opportunities to win work on the US programme."

Defence Committee’s Press Release re: First Report of Session 2002­03 on Missile Defence

The Defence Committee today publishes its First Report on Missile Defence, which focuses on the rationale for and implications of an upgrade of the Ballistic Missile Early Warning station at RAF Fylingdales, requested by the US Government. The report is also available on the Committee's website. (A separate volume of written and oral evidence on which the report is based will be published tomorrow-HC 290-II).

The Committee conclude that there is a real and increasing threat from the proliferation of ballistic missiles. The United States is justified in believing that it is a principal potential target of that threat. It is therefore justified in taking steps to counteract it.

The US Missile Defence programme is one such step, although it cannot be the whole solution. It would be capable of defending against at most a handful of missiles: It is not the son of 'Star Wars' as envisaged in the 1980s to provide an impenetrable shield for the USA. There are still significant technical obstacles to be overcome, and at great cost, before an effective system could be deployed. But the US has made substantial progress. In doing so it has so far not caused the international instability which many had predicted.

One element of the proposed Missile Defence system involves the upgrade of computer software and hardware for the radar at RAF Fylingdales. Fylingdales, although a British base operated by the RAF, is one of four US Ballistic Missile Early Warning System stations. The upgrade would allow information which the radar already captures to be used to track missiles more accurately so that interceptors in the USA or on board US warships could be targeted at them. Although it is a discrete proposition which would not imply consent to any further development or UK involvement, it would in effect draw the UK a little way down the path to active participation.

The Committee conclude that the UK should agree to the upgrade at Fylingdales. The factors in favour of that agreement-the importance of the UK-US relationship, the improvement to the early warning capability, the opportunity to keep open the prospect of future missile defence for the UK and the potential for UK industrial participation in the programme's further development-outweigh the arguments against.

The Committee strongly regret, however, the way in which the issue has been handled by the Government. It was a mistake on the part of the MoD to fail to respond to calls for a public debate of this issue for much of last year. But, by announcing on 15 January that it was his preliminary conclusion that the UK must agree to the request, the Secretary of State effectively prevented that debate from taking place. The MoD then told the Committee that the Government's decision might be formally passed to the US Government as soon as 31 January 2003. The Committee can find no reason for this sudden urgency. In order to produce this report within this apparently arbitrary timescale the Committee have had to agree it without allowing local people and organisations to appear before us (although it took into account the many written submissions received).

The Committee deplore the manner in which the public debate on the issue of the upgrade of facilities at RAF Fylingdales has been handled by the Ministry of Defence. It has shown no respect for either the views of those affected locally by the decision or for the arguments of those opposed to the upgrade in principle. Despite the Secretary of State's unequivocal statement that he wanted the decision to be informed by public and parliamentary discussion, he has acted in a way that has effectively curtailed such discussions.

The Committee felt obliged to publish a report setting out our views on the US request within the timescale imposed upon us by the Ministry of Defence. But this does not conclude its interest in the subject. The Committee intend to continue its inquiries by looking more broadly at missile defence issues including the potential security benefits of missile defence both for the UK itself and for forces deployed overseas, and to what extent the UK might benefit from the US programme in terms of industrial participation. The Committee will also wish to follow up those matters relating to the upgrade of RAF Fylingdales which could not be addressed fully in this report. [29.01.2003]

Note to Editors: The membership of the Defence Committee is as follows-

Rt Hon Bruce George MP (Walsall South) (Chairman)
James Cran MP (Beverley and Holderness)
David Crausby MP (Bolton North East)
Mike Hancock CBE MP (Portsmouth South)
Gerald Howarth MP (Aldershot)
Kevan Jones MP (North Durham)
Jim Knight MP (South Dorset)
Patrick Mercer OBE MP (Newark)
Syd Rapson BEM MP (Portsmouth North)
Frank Roy MP (Motherwell and Wishaw)
Rachel Squire MP (Dunfermline West)

MOD Memorandum in response to Defence Committee’s First Report of Session 2002­03 on Missile Defence:

1. The Government welcomes the Committee's Report and its main conclusion that the United Kingdom Government should agree to the US Government's request for the proposed upgrade to the facilities at RAF Fylingdales for missile defence purposes. It is convinced that it is in the best interests of the UK that we retain options for the future development and possible acquisition of missile defences, subject to further examination of the complex issues involved. RAF Fylingdales will be an important element in the US programme for both developmental and operational use, and would be a key building block in any extended missile defence that might give protection to the UK and Europe. By agreeing to this upgrade, the Government believes it will ultimately enhance the security of the UK and the NATO Alliance.

On 17 December 2002, the US Government requested an upgrade of the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System station at RAF Fylingdales, to allow it to be used for missile defence purposes. We deplore the manner in which the public debate on that issue of the upgrade has been handled by the Ministry of Defence. It has shown no respect for either the views of those affected locally by the decision or for the arguments of those opposed to the upgrade in principle.

2. The Government does not accept the suggestion that the Ministry of Defence has shown no respect for the views of opponents of the upgrade or those affected locally. The MOD published a discussion paper on 9 December, to which it has received a large number of responses. The Defence Secretary has attended public meetings in North Yorkshire to hear local views, and officials have maintained close contact with local planning authorities to keep them informed of plans and to listen to their views. The MOD also responds to large numbers of letters on the subject. The Government has encouraged full and effective Parliamentary and public discussion of the issues raised. There have been many opportunities for MPs and members of the public to make their views known, including through a MOD website and e­mail address. The Defence Secretary described work in the United States on missile defence in the House on 17 October 2002 and made an oral Statement on 15 January. There was further opportunity for Parliamentary debate on 22 January. The MOD has assisted the Committee's present inquiry, to which the Defence Secretary gave evidence in March 2002 and again in January 2003.

We believe that it is incumbent on the MOD to publish as much of the detail of the request as it is able to. For example, more information could be published on the timescale for the upgrade and for its incorporation into the US missile defence system and how the system would be able to track missiles. Such additional information should also address radiation emissions and other local concerns.

3. In evidence to the Committee and in other fora, the MOD has indicated that it will provide a report to the local planning authority giving details of the upgrade and its timescale and providing information about radar emissions and other environmental aspects. Although the essential details are already clear to MOD, further site surveys and exchanges of information with the US are necessary before the full details can be presented. On the basis of current information, we expect that this evidence will demonstrate that no formal process of planning consultation is necessary. The MOD report will be in a form that the Authority may make public if it so chooses.

We see no reason to believe that agreeing to this upgrade will lead inevitably to further development or deployment at Fylingdales itself, or indeed elsewhere in the UK. But that agreement to the US request does represent at least a step or two down the path towards active participation in Missile Defence.

4. The Government has been at pains to point out that the upgrade of the radar at RAF Fylingdales does not imply that any further development of this or any other site will be undertaken. In evidence, it has explained, for instance, how US plans for X­Band radars are not settled, and are tending towards a sea­based deployment option ­ indeed the US is already building such a platform as part of its missile defence test bed. The Government has also made clear that decisions on deployment of missile defences to protect US friends and allies, including ground based interceptors, are some way off. The upgrade is a discrete proposition which does not commit the UK to any deeper involvement in the deployment of missile defences, although it gives the Government options to do so, should it decide on that at a later date. Separately, the MOD intends to agree a new technical Memorandum of Understanding with the United States, which would give it full insight into the development of the US missile defence programme and provide the opportunity for UK industry to benefit from participation. But any UK acquisition of missile defence would be subject to a separate decision, at the relevant time. The Government will approach this issue in stages, considering each step in the light of how both the threat and how the relevant technologies evolve.

We do not believe that the opponents of missile defence strengthen their case by resorting to allegations about hidden US motives. The United States of America is one of the UK's closest allies. We share many of the same values, both political and ethical. We prefer to judge American intentions on the basis of their official statements about the purpose of its missile defence programme. We do not assume that there must be some more or less sinister ulterior motive behind their request to upgrade Fylingdales.

5. The Government agrees. Missile defences are just that: defences. They threaten no­one. This capability would need to be used only if a ballistic missile has actually been fired. Once such a missile is in the air, and threatening a devastating impact, it is unthinkable that anyone could not want to be in a position to shoot it down.

We very much welcome the MOD's approach of putting its case to the planning authorities in a form that could be made public. Those who will need persuading that the local impact of the upgrade will not be significant extend beyond the planning authorities. It would seem that many of the concerns raised by various groups spring from a misplaced apprehension that the UK will inevitably field the full panoply of the Missile Defence system, and an exaggerated view of health hazards that might be caused by the proposed upgrade. But the MOD has not done as much as it could to present the full facts and explain carefully how such misgivings are misplaced. The MOD must now grasp this opportunity to clarify Fylingdales' role and its environmental impact.

6. As indicated in response to Recommendation (ii), the MOD will provide a detailed report on the upgrade in a form that could be made public. This will address the issue of perceived health hazards, on which earlier material has already been provided to the local planning authority and to the Committee. The MOD will also continue to explain publicly the continuing role of RAF Fylingdales and the Government's approach to future decisions on missile defence relating to the UK. The Government's efforts to promote local consultation and explanation were described above [Recommendation (i)]; it considers that the whole process has been conducted with particular openness.

If the UK wishes to keep its options open on a possible missile defence for the UK, it is clearly in our interests to respond positively to the present request. Furthermore, we do not believe that the UK, or the Fylingdales area, would face any material additional risks from the upgrade, in terms either of health risks from radiation or an increased likelihood of potential attackers identifying Fylingdales as a target. Nor do we believe that arguments that missile defence may cause international instability provide compelling grounds for rejecting the US request.

1. The Government welcomes the Committee's conclusion that the UK, including North Yorkshire, would not face any material additional health or security risks arising from the upgrade. The security interests of the United Kingdom are already closely identified with those of the US and other NATO allies, and this will not change regardless of decisions on missile defence. The Government also believes that any increased threat to RAF Fylingdales itself is negligible. For the foreseeable future, states of concern are very unlikely to have the sophisticated capability or size of arsenal to consider targeting specific points or military installations. Long range missiles in their hands will essentially be weapons of terror. On the issue of international stability, missile defence is not intended to defend against responsible states with established strategic forces. Its aim is to tackle limited threats from states of concern with emergent missile capabilities, which seek to acquire and threaten to use ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction in contravention of widely accepted international norms. The proliferation threat is not new; missile defence is a response to, not the cause of, the problem.

Court news and arrests:
On 11 November 2002 in the High Court London before Mr Justice Kaye Lindis  renewed an application for leave for a Judicial Review against the decision by the Police Complaints Authority to grant a dispensation  to the Deputy Chief Constable of the Ministry of Defence Police Agency (MDPA - as the interested party) not to investigate a complaint against Inspector Barry Frost (MDPA).

The application was dismissed on a 'out of time' technicality. The PCA and the MDPA applied for costs against Lindis. The Judge refused their application. This case arose out of a fabricated charge by Barry Frost of alleged assault and criminal damage to his spectacles by Lindis in an incident at Fylingdales on 1 August 2000. Barry Frost also manipulated and abused the law of Military Land byelaws which have been in contention at many US bases for years.

Lindis was convicted of 'assault' but found not guilty of criminal damage to the spectacles. The conviction was quashed on appeal at York Crown Court. Both the Magistrates at Pickering and the Judge and the two Magistrates sitting at York Crown Court commented that they found the alleged criminal damage to the spectacles to be 'curious'. It is our belief that Barry Frost must have damaged the spectacles himself.

Barry Frost now has two complaints which have been substantiated by the PCA - one in 1990 brought by Lindis and the other brought by Anni who was also involved in the incident in August 2002. On both occasions he was 'admonished' by the PCA. Furthermore soon after the first substantiated complaint he was promoted from Sergeant to Inspector. He was promoted to Acting Chief Inspector at Menwith Hill but has since been moved to a 'desk' job after an incident at Menwith Hill.

What was highlighted throughout this case is the inaccessibility of the law to the citizen. The exercise of bringing such an action was very valuable however and it is the first time that Lindis has pursued this particular legal route. The experience will be very useful for any future Judicial Review applications.

MDPA refuse to arrest  under Byelaws: Friday  25 April 2003:
CAAB was at Fylingdales today to test the enforcement of the military land byelaws. When met by two Ministry of Defence Police officers Lindis  immediately said that she had committed and was committing an offence under the byelaws.

PC Daryl Jones immediately said that there were 'new guidelines' not to use the byelaws but to use s.68 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 ('aggravated trespass') instead. Neither he nor his colleague were interested in any discussion about the byelaws.

Lindis was arrested for 'aggressive trespass' and taken to Scarborough Police Station (later it was gently brought to the attention of the officer that the alleged offence was in fact 'aggravated' not 'aggressive' 'trespass'). She was held for over 6 hours while an officer came from Catterick Garrison to interview her. She was later charged with:

"....having trespassed on land in the open air, namely Fylingdales Moor and in relation to a lawful activity, namely the security of MOD property in which persons were on that land did an act, namely caused security staff to be diverted from normal patrols which you intended to have the effect of disrupting that activity". Bail conditions were yet again imposed.

The arresting officer informed Lindis that the 'new guidelines' not to use the byelaws had been brought in the week before on the instructions of Lloyd Clark (Chief Constable of the Ministry of Defence Police Agency) and in consultation with the Association of Chief Police Officers. The Custody Sergeant at Scarborough Police Station had also been informed of the new guidelines with the implication that there were to be no charges under the byelaws.

Military Land byelaws are the first legal protection round many of bases (USAF Lakenheath, USAF Mildenhall, NSA Menwith Hill, JAC Molesworth for example) There are signs all round the base at Fylingdales (and at other bases) which inform the public that the byelaws are in force.

She is in consultation with lawyers as to the legal route to pursue after yet again the CPS refusing to allow another byelaws case to come to court for  trial. [Refer to Menwith Hill byelaws item ].

Liberty again taken away:

Lindis was immediately arrested for alleged breach of bail conditions while researching land at the back of Fylingdales on Saturday 3 May 2003.  This land had previously been owned and maintained by the Forestry Commission.   However she was informed by the MDPA that the land had been bought by the MOD two months ago.  There was no indication of the new boundary by way of notices or boundary markers.  She was detained in police custody at Scarborough police station over the weekend and appeared in court on Monday. 

In court John Hargreaves (CPS) withdrew the allegation of the breach of bail conditions, saying that there were wooden posts with fluorescent paint on top but no notices marking the boundary. 

Lindis is discussing this latest spurious detention with lawyers.

Since buying the land the MOD have cut down all the trees which were planted by the Forestry Commission, apparently as a security measure.

Action:
There have been many actions and demonstrations during the US led attack against Iraq and attention has been focussed on this base by many more people.  Refer to Lakenheath Action Network website: www.lakenheathaction.org

The American National Guard was deployed at this base, USAF Mildenhall, JAC Molesworth and USAF Fairford for the first time in the UK. 

Fighter squadron nominated for achievement award:
The 493rd Fighter Squadron, Royal Air Force Lakenheath, England, has been nominated from Headquarters U.S. Air Forces in Europe for the 2002 Raytheon Hughes Achievement Award.

Started in 1953 by Hughes Aircraft Company, the award is given annually to the top air-superiority or air-defense squadron in the Air Force. [Ramstein Air Base, Germany (USAFENS) PR – 22.04.2003]

This base has also been subject to attention from various groups.  It played an essential role during the conflict with the American National Guard being brought in  – also for the first time in the UK.